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Abstract Delay-/Disruption-Tolerant Networking represents 
an innovative way to cope with satellite communications 
impairments. In this view, the paper presents an in-depth 
analysis of implications of a DTN approach to satellite 
communications, focusing on these fundamental aspects: 
network architecture, security, and Quality of Service (QoS). 
For each topic, commonalities and differences between DTN 
and Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) are highlighted, 
to show that the DTN architecture can be seen as a 
promising evolution of PEPs, at present the most widely 
adopted architecture. The analysis shows that DTN can 
effectively improve PEPs functionalities in the presence of 
intermittent and disruptive channels and/or a high level of 
network heterogeneity. In particular, DTN offers the 
possibility to operate with intermittent channels, a better 
resilience to channel disruptions, the possibility to implement 
both end-to-end and hop-by-hop security, and a greater 
flexibility in the use of advanced QoS techniques. 
Index Terms— DTN, PEPs, Security, QoS, Satellite 
Communications. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Satellite communications present some distinctive 
features which deserve to be briefly analyzed. On the 
positive side, they offer a very effective way to offer a fast 
coverage of large areas. Through satellites, ubiquitous 
Internet access can be offered at reasonable costs in 
developing countries and in scarcely populated areas, thus 
helping in reducing the digital divide. Moreover, satellite 
communications are essential to support rescue teams in 
case of natural calamities, like earthquakes and flooding, 
when the terrestrial communication infrastructure is 
usually seriously damaged. On the other hand, satellite 
systems, and in particular GEO, have to cope with a series 
of peculiar challenges at different levels of the protocol 
stack. In particular, if we focus on Transport and upper 
layers, performance is challenged by the following 
impairments [1]: long Round Trip Times (RTTs), 
especially for GEO systems (about 600 ms); possible 
presence of segment losses due to residual errors on the 
satellite link; possible channel disruptions, especially for 
mobile terminals, due to satellite link obstructions 
(buildings, tunnels, etc.). 
To take full advantage of satellites it is necessary to 
cope with the impairments mentioned above. Although an 
end-to-end approach, i.e. the use of an optimized transport 
protocol (or an optimized version of TCP) on both end 
nodes (client and server) is theoretically possible, it is not 
practical for general servers. In fact, as satellite clients are 
a small user niche for general content providers, they have 
no real advantage in introducing a modification of the 
customary protocol stack just to offer a better Quality of 
Service (QoS) to the satellite user segment. To retain the 
possibility to adopt transport protocol variants optimized 
to the satellite link, the usual solution is given by 
Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs), or protocol 
accelerators, based on the TCP splitting technique [2], [3]. 
They are intermediate nodes, inserted either at one end 
(integrated PEP), or more frequently both ends 
(distributed PEPs), of the satellite link, to isolate the 
satellite link (and its impairments) from the rest of the 
network. In short, they split the original end-to-end 
connection in two (integrated) or three (distributed) 
separate connections, thus allowing the use of optimized 
protocol on the satellite segment. PEPs are an effective 
solution and have the important advantage of being 
transparent to end user. By contrast, they violate the end-
to-end semantics of transport protocols, and have other 
serious disadvantages from the point of view of security, 
as TCP splitting is incompatible with IPSec. A different 
approach, which somewhat retains and actually extends 
the concept of TCP splitting, is that based on the DTN 
architecture [4], [5], [6]. DTN is particularly suited to 
cope with intermittent connectivity provided by single 
LEO satellite (e.g. for data sensing) or incomplete 
constellations (e.g. for vehicle and good tracking) [7]. 
However, it can represent a valid alternative to PEP also 
in GEO systems, as shown in [8] and [9] for continuous 
and disruptive channels, respectively. 
The present paper aims to focus the reader attention on 
the most relevant features of DTN, when applied to 
satellite communication in general, and GEO in particular. 
To this end, the core of the paper, which follows this 
introduction, consists of three sections, each of which 
devoted to the analysis of a different macro-aspect: 
architecture, security and QoS. The analysis is 
comparative, DTN vs. PEPs, to highlight the novelty 
aspects of the DTN approach. The aim is twofold: first, to 
make aware the reader who is expert on satellite 
communications of the new opportunities offered by 
DTN; second, to convince the reader who is expert on 
DTN, but perhaps less familiar with the peculiar 
characteristics of satellite communications, that these 
represent an important and promising application field. 
II. DTN ARCHITECTURE 
The most common DTN architecture is that based on 
the introduction of the Bundle layer between Transport 
         
and Application layers. The corresponding “Bundle 
protocol” can interface with different transport protocols 
through “convergence layer adapters”, as shown in the 
figure below [5], [6]. 
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Figure 1. DTN architecture and protocol stack. 
The new architecture has many novelty aspects with 
respect of TCP/IP based networks [4], [10]. The most 
prominent, when dealing with satellite communications, 
are summarized below by comparing, whenever possible, 
the new DTN architecture with satellite PEPs. 
A. DTN as an overlay 
First, although TCP/IP protocols are not replaced (at 
least not necessarily), their role is changed. In particular, 
the new DTN architecture is particularly useful when it 
acts as an overlay on top of a heterogeneous network 
consisting of many homogeneous segments, such as 
wireless sensor/ad-hoc networks, wired Internet, wireless 
LANs, satellite links, etc. By installing the DTN Bundle 
protocol on end-points and on nodes at the border of 
homogeneous segments, the end-to-end path is divided in 
many DTN hops. On each DTN hop a different protocol 
stack can be used, or, when the same stack is retained, 
which is the most common case, just different protocols, 
like TCP or UDP, or different versions of the same 
protocol (e.g. different variant of TCP). In this 
architecture, the end-to-end transport protocol features are 
redefined, being confined inside each DTN hop. In fact, 
real end-to-end data transfer from DTN sender to DTN 
receiver is now provided by the Bundle protocol, which 
exchanges large data packets, called “bundles”, between 
DTN nodes through a store-and-forward relay mechanism. 
Readers familiar with satellite communications can 
easily realize that the DTN multi hop architecture can be 
seen as a generalization of the TCP splitting concept 
widely used in satellite PEPs. In particular, both allow the 
use of optimized protocols (or optimized versions of the 
same protocol) on the satellite segment. However, in DTN 
the “splitting” is a direct consequence of the new 
architecture, while in PEPs it implies a severe violation of 
the end-to-end TCP semantics. In fact, intermediate PEPs 
must operate at Transport and Application layers, while 
the protocol stack reserves these functionalities to end 
nodes only. It is clearly unsafe that intermediate nodes 
disguise themselves as end nodes, by forging fake ACKs. 
More practically, this prevents the use of IPSec (see the 
next section). On the other hand, by contrast to PEPs, the 
DTN architecture is not transparent to end nodes.  
B. Information storage at intermediate nodes 
The second, but not less important, difference between 
DTN and customary TCP/IP network is related to 
information storage. In standard networks, because of 
usual assumptions of continuous connectivity and short 
delays, information is stored only at end nodes, i.e. 
outside of the network core. This because, dealing with 
reliable transmission, information is supposed to be easily 
retrieved directly from the source. Of course, this is not 
the case in challenged networks, where the usual 
assumptions do not hold anymore. Therefore, to deal with 
long RTTs and channel disruptions, and to cope with the 
extreme case of possible absence of end-to-end 
connectivity, in DTN networks information is stored at 
intermediate DTN nodes. 
This feature actually differentiates DTN architecture 
from usual PEPs. In PEPs too, some segments can be 
stored, but this storage is temporary and just finalized at 
synchronizing the incoming with the outgoing segment 
flows. Note that the segment rate of the incoming flow 
can be easily controlled by PEPs by increasing or 
decreasing the advertised window. Summarizing, in PEPs 
only few segments are stored; they are stored in volatile 
memory and in case of long link interruptions or PEP 
failures, they get lost. By contrast, DTN bundles, which 
usually are much larger than segments, can be stored at 
intermediate nodes for long period of times, and, when the 
custody option (see the next subsection for details) is 
enabled, saved on non volatile memory (e.g. on local hard 
disk). This makes DTN much more robust against 
disruptions, disconnections, and temporary node failures. 
On the other hand, memorization in local databases 
requires raise congestion control issues that still need to 
be addressed. 
C. Custody transfer option 
By enabling the custody transfer option [11], 
intermediate DTN nodes are asked to accept bundle 
custody, i.e. to accept responsibility for bundle reliable 
delivery to the final destination. If the request is accepted, 
bundles are written in local databases where they are 
safely kept until, after successful transmission, custody is 
transferred to another “custodian”, or the bundle is 
delivered to the final destination, or the bundle lifetime 
expires. This feature offers a significant reliability 
improvement in the presence of discontinuous or 
disruptive channels. To see why, let us recall that while 
the Maximum Tolerable Disruption Length (MTDL) of a 
TCP connection is about 20 minutes (Linux defaults), the 
Bundle protocol MTDL is longer than 24 hours (DTN2 
reference implementation defaults) [12]. Although this is 
independent of the actual use of custody transfer, this 
option makes bundle storage safe even against 
intermediate node failures. Moreover, the acceptance of 
custody by intermediate nodes, allows the sender to delete 
data accepted in custody. This can be useful whenever the 
sender has limited memory resources (or good reasons not 
to keep in its memory sensitive information, like in 
military applications). 
         
In summary, DTN architecture is much more resilient 
to long disruptions than usual TCP connections and PEPs. 
It must, however, be emphasized that the actual resilience 
of TCP to long disruption is highly configurable. So in 
principle, in a TCP splitting PEP the TCP connection on 
the satellite segment can be effectively tuned to this end. 
This in turn requires, in commercial services with large 
number of users, to keep open a huge number of TCP 
connections on intermediate PEPs to cope with (possible) 
disruptions, which is highly inefficient (large buffer 
memory is required) and not desirable from the point of 
view of service providers. By contrast, not only does DTN 
architecture offer better resilience against long 
disruptions, but, thanks to custody transfer, also resilience 
against possible node failures and a better use of end-
nodes memory resources. 
D. Proactive and reactive bundle fragmentation 
An interesting feature of DTN Bundle protocol is the 
possibility of fragmenting bundles. RFCs [5] and [6] 
distinguish between proactive and reactive fragmentation. 
The former has been conceived to cope with intermittent 
periodic connectivity, where there may be a stringent 
constraint on the maximum amount of data that can be 
transferred (contact volume) on a DTN hop at each 
availability time window (contact time). Whenever the 
contact volume is known a priori, as in LEO and in deep 
space communications, proactive fragmentation allows 
large bundles to be divided “a priori” into multiple 
fragments compatible with the contact volume. By 
contrast, reactive fragmentation works a posteriori, when 
long channel disruptions interrupt a bundle transfer. In 
order not to retransmit successfully received data, the 
bundle only partially transmitted is split into two 
“fragments”. The first contains data already sent, the 
second the other ones. At link re-establishment, only the 
second fragment is transmitted. Bundle fragments are 
treated as ordinary bundles, and consecutive 
fragmentations are possible. The reactive fragmentation is 
particularly useful when disruptions may be relatively 
frequent, as in satellite communications with mobile 
terminals, when obstacles (buildings, tunnels, etc.) may 
prevent satellite signal reception. 
Both proactive and reactive fragmentations are 
distinctive features of DTN. 
III. DTN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
Due to the DTN characteristics described in section II, 
the security architecture requires some distinctive features 
that will be detailed below in sub-section A. By contrast, 
PEPs do not have any specific security architecture and 
they borrow the traditional security mechanisms from the 
Internet such as IPSec and Transport Layer Security 
(TLS), as detailed in sub-section B. 
A. DTN Security state of art 
Current Internet security protocols (such as IPSec and 
TLS) do not perform well in high delay/disruption 
conditions, because of underlying assumption on which 
they are built, such as: end-to-end connectivity always 
present; low link delays between communicating parties 
and low error rate on link channels. Thus, new security 
architecture is needed to meet DTN requirements [13], 
[14] and [15].  
Let us focus the attention on Figure 2, which shows two 
DTN Bundle Nodes BN1 and BN4 from two different 
networks connected to each other through DTN gateways 
BN2 and BN3. Any DTN node originating or forwarding 
a bundle, stores it in its memory until it has been delivered 
to the next node, showing a “Store and Forward” style of 
communication as explained in section II.C. 
 
Figure 2. Internetworking of DTN networks using bundle gateways  
The security architecture supports hop-by-hop and end-
to-end authentication and integrity validation, to ensure 
data is correct before forwarding. Figure 3 shows the hop-
by-hop authentication/integrity check using Bundle 
Authentication Block (BAB). The BAB is used to assure 
the authenticity and integrity of the bundle along a single 
hop from forwarder to intermediate receiver. Thus, the 
communication path is divided into security zones (as 
shown in Figure 3). Similarly, the Payload Integrity Block 
(PIB) and Payload Confidentiality Block (PCB) are used 
for end-to-end security services. Further details on 
security architecture in DTN can be found in [14]. 
 
Figure 3. Hop-by-hop authentication and integrity check (from [14]). 
Key Management is one of the most difficult problems 
in DTN security. DTN security requires that before 
forwarding the bundle it must be authenticated and 
integrity checked. In DTN, link availability is an 
         
important resource and special techniques need to be 
applied to maximise the utilization of such link and 
minimise the overheads of key management. 
B. Security impact on Performance Enhancing Proxies 
There are limitations for implementing end-to-end 
security in the presence of PEPs and other intermediate 
network entities [3]. Examples of such limitations are 
presented below. 
Conflicts between IPSec and TCP PEP. TCP PEP 
operates on information stored in the header of a TCP 
packet such as TCP flow identification and sequence and 
ACK numbers. When a TCP session is performed on top 
of the IPSec ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) 
protocol, the TCP header is encrypted inside the ESP 
header. It is, thus, impossible for an intermediate gateway 
(like TCP PEP) outside sender or receiver’s security 
enclaves to analyze an IPSec header to extract TCP flow 
information. 
Application Layer Proxies/Agents. Web proxies need to 
parse the TCP and HTTP header of a passing IP datagram 
and serve it with the web page from local cache. It is 
transparent to end-users but boosts the responsiveness of 
satellite and wireless networks. Again, end-to-end IPSec 
will prevent the operation of these web proxies.  
Traffic Engineering. Flow classification is essential in 
providing classes of services and QoS support. These 
include Random Early Detection (RED) and router-based 
congestion control and policing, integrated services 
(intserv) with Resource Reservation Protocol, (RSVP), 
and differentiated services (diffserv) and Multi Protocol 
Label Switching (MPLS). Again, this may potentially 
conflict with IPSec (especially in IPSec in tunnel mode). 
To overcome these limitations security must be 
implemented in such a way that allows Satellite Terminal 
(ST) and Gateway PEPs to access the transport protocol 
headers for Transport PEPs (T-PEPs) and HTTP content 
for Application PEPs (A-PEPs). Transport/application 
layer security (such as Transport Layer Security, TLS and 
secure HTTP) will work seamlessly with T-PEPs because 
the TCP header is not encrypted by the security system 
(see in Figure 4). However, transport/application layer 
security will not function with A-PEPs. The reason is that 
application layer data will be encrypted by the security 
system. Hence, it will not be possible to perform 
techniques such as HTTP pre-fetching, caching and 
header and payload compressions. 
End-to-end network layer security (such as IPSec) will 
encrypt the TCP header and user data; therefore, both T-
PEPs and A-PEPs will not work. As such, T-PEPs will not 
be able to perform techniques such as TCP spoofing, ACK 
reduction and flow control. In addition, A-PEPs will not 
be able to perform HTTP prefetching, caching and 
compression. Thus a user or network administrator must 
choose between PEPs and end-to-end IPSec. 
As shown in Figure 4, PEPs can be used successfully 
with IPSec in tunnel mode between the satellite ST and 
Gateway.  Here the encryption is performed on incoming 
traffic after the PEP operations and decryption is 
performed on outgoing traffic before the PEP operations. 
The IPSec operations are under the control of the satellite 
network operator. In terms of overhead, IPSec tunnel 
mode requires an extra IP header, where basic IPv4 header 
is 20 bytes and IPv6 header is 40 bytes. Figure 4 shows 
also the link layer security mechanism that can be used 
(e.g. DVB-RCS [16] security or Unidirectional Link 
Encapsulation (ULE) security [17]). Here T-PEPs and A-
PEPs will work seamlessly over the secure satellite link. 
The reason is TCP header and user data are handled in 
clear text (no encryption) both in the Gateway PEP and in 
the ST PEP. Then, the satellite link layer security is only 
applied between the BSM ST and GW (satellite 
terminals). 
Although link layer security does not provide the 
desired end-to-end security, it is more efficient than using 
IPSec (in tunnel mode).  It also can provide extra security 
functions that are not possible with IPSec or upper layer 
security such user identity hiding (such as IP and terminal 
MAC addresses).  This allows providing strong privacy 
service over the satellite broadcasting link. 
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Figure 4. Security solutions with PEPs. 
C. Comparison between DTN and PEP security 
Examining security issues in DTN and PEPs highlights 
that intermediate entities require access to some parts of 
the end-to-end packets exchanged between the source and 
destination. The presence of PEPs limits the security 
solution to link layer security such as the DVB-RCS or 
ULE security. On the other hand, DTN and the Bundle 
protocol are application layer functions, which means that 
both hop-by-hop and end-to-end security can be provided 
by BAB and PCB (as shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
Moreover, also within a single DTN subnet, it is possible 
to use link layer security such as the DVB-RCS and ULE 
security. 
In summary, by comparing DTN and PEPs, it results 
that DTN bundle security is a better and more flexible 
solution when dealing with network heterogeneity and the 
presence of intermediate entities. Moreover, the hop-by-
hop authentication allows DTN intermediate nodes to 
reject unwanted traffic and preserve the limited DTN 
resources. 
IV. DTN AND QUALITY OF SERVICE  
A. The importance of QoS 
As mentioned earlier an essential aspect of modern 
         
telecommunication networks, which include DTN, is QoS. 
The importance of QoS increases in parallel with the 
evolution of telecommunication networks, characterized 
by a great heterogeneity. On one hand, many applications 
require a specific level of assurance from the network. On 
the other hand, communication networks are characterized 
by many levels of heterogeneity: network portions 
managed by different Service Providers; different 
transmission means, such as cables, satellites, and radios; 
different implemented solutions, such as ATM, IPv4, 
IPv6, and MPLS. Moreover, a network may be 
heterogeneous also from the point of view of users, who 
can require different services and have a different methods 
to pay for them. The challenge is to offer end-to-end QoS 
guarantees over such heterogeneous networks 
transparently to the users. The requirements are: 
 QoS requests should traverse the overall network 
from the source to the destination, through 
portions that implement different technologies and 
different protocols; 
 QoS requests should be received and understood 
by each specific portion where QoS may have a 
different meaning and interpretation, which 
depend on used protocols and network features; 
 QoS requests should be managed by control 
mechanisms suited for the aim; 
 Each single QoS solution is composed of layered 
architectures and each layer must have a specific 
role in QoS provision. 
As stated in [18], the overall problem of QoS 
interworking may be structured into two different actions: 
vertical QoS mapping and horizontal QoS mapping. 
The concept of vertical QoS mapping is based on the 
idea that a telecommunication network is composed of 
functional layers and that each single layer must have a 
role for end-to-end QoS provision. The overall result 
depends on the QoS achieved at each layer and it is based 
on the functions performed at layer interfaces. The idea is 
to define an interface between adjacent layers through 
which to offer a specific QoS service. For example, if 
layer 3 implements efficient QoS mechanisms, it is topical 
that layer 2 can assure a specific service to layer 3; 
otherwise the implementation of complex QoS mechanism 
at layer 3 is useless. QoS requirements flow vertically and 
need to be received, understood, and satisfied by the layer 
below. 
The concept of horizontal QoS mapping, even if linked 
to the previous concept when implemented, is represented 
by the need to transfer QoS requirements among network 
portions implementing different technologies and 
protocols.  
The implementation of both vertical and horizontal 
mappings requires the use of specific QoS management 
functions and QoS architectures. As also envisaged in 
previous sections, the idea is that each single network 
portion composing the heterogeneous network deserves a 
peculiar solution. Special tools called QoS gateways and 
implemented through QoS Relay Nodes can take charge 
of that [18]. 
B. QoS Gateways 
Today's Internet protocols are not particularly suited for 
heterogeneous environments, in particular if characterized 
by very long delay paths and possible link disruptions, as 
in DTN networks. In more detail, the heterogeneity 
introduces the need of proper architectures to manage the 
inter-working of satellite/wireless/cable network portions 
and to connect heterogeneous, possibly non-IP end 
systems. A possible reference concerning networking is 
represented by the Broadband Satellite Multimedia (BSM) 
architecture, developed by the European 
Telecommunications Standardization Institute (ETSI). It 
separates the layers identified as Satellite Dependent (SD) 
(data link and physical layer) from the ones identified as 
Satellite Independent (SI) (IP and upper layers). The 
interface between SI and SD layers is defined through SI-
SAPs (Satellite Independent – Service Access Points). A 
possible action is to generalize the interface also for radio 
and cable interfaces so getting a common management of 
the lower layers interfaces. The new interface can be 
called TI-SAP (Technology Independent – Service Access 
Point), as done in [18]. Within the TI-SAP, as well as 
within any other interface of this type, there is the need of 
QoS Mapping. The aim is to define a mapping between 
various QoS definitions and capabilities used in the 
different network portions. The mapping mechanism and 
implementation should give origin to a “seamless” 
communication. The mapping should be provided both 
“vertically” and “horizontally”. 
Within the mentioned architecture, the design of 
specialized protocols is topical. Novel solutions may be 
applied at each protocol layer. Physical and data link 
layers are fundamentally concerned with the 
implementation of resource allocation schemes. The 
network layer has to efficiently use the bandwidth offered 
by the lower layers and implement QoS reservation and 
QoS mapping mechanisms. Transport and application 
protocols must efficiently use the services offered by the 
network layer. In this view, a cross-layer based approach 
is envisaged. The cross-layer definition allows a protocol 
entity to exploit the knowledge of a set of available 
parameters (measured or estimated) from the underlying 
layers and, hence, to provide an optimization framework 
involving all the layers. More specifically concerning 
resource allocation, the aim is to find efficient and flexible 
allocation and reservation schemes, which also include 
congestion control and monitoring. As said, this topic is 
strictly connected with the implementation of physical and 
data link layers. The need to guarantee a specific QoS has 
implied the development of dynamic bandwidth allocation 
techniques, which take into account the current status of 
the channel.  
The features mentioned above should be developed and 
implemented within QoS Gateways, whose design may 
also be object of a dedicated research project. A similar 
approach is already applied in EU projects [19] and [20]. 
The way to implementation is long and steep but some 
literature can help fix some basics. [18] has proposed a 
network node, called Quality of Service Relay Node 
         
(QoS-RN), which is a basic QoS Gateway and includes 
the essentials of the features mentioned above. QoS-RN 
should be located among networks that implement 
different technological solutions. QoS-RN may also 
implement extended functions within the Relay Layer 
including transport and application layer enhancements 
such as PEPs (Performance Enhancing Proxies) 
functionalities. Figure 5 shows the architectural proposal 
reported in [18] to implement the QoS-RN between two 
networks. Network B in the middle deserves a dedicated 
special protocol stack to be optimized and the Relay Layer 
takes care of that. It means that the Relay Layer may 
implement, in case of need, two different protocol stacks: 
one towards Network B and one towards the external parts 
(Networks A and C).  
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Figure 5. QoS Gateway action 
As said in section II Bundle protocol is also suitable to 
act as overlay on top of heterogeneous networks as shown 
in Figure 1. The role of the Bundle layer as gateway to 
join different networks is mentioned also in [21] and in 
[10], where DTN architecture is presented also as a 
framework for dealing heterogeneity. Actually, the 
similarity of the architectures reported in Figure 1 and 
Figure 5 is immediate. The Bundle layer acts similarly to 
the Relay Layer, at least from the position in the stack. 
The idea may be merging the QoS Gateway with the DTN 
node from the functionalities viewpoint so to create a 
device that can provide the quality of service, mobility, 
and security capabilities of the QoS Gateways and the 
power of managing intermittent and disruptive links as 
well as large and variable delays of the DTN nodes. 
Interactions between QoS, mobility and security had been 
often ignored in the past and need further investigation. 
The idea of a new intelligent DTN gateway may be the 
object of future research activity 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
In the paper, we have examined the pros and cons of the 
DTN architecture when applied to satellite 
communications. The analysis has been carried out in a 
differential way, by highlighting both analogies and 
differences with PEPs, and focusing the attention on three 
aspects: network architecture, security and QoS. The 
analysis confirms that a DTN approach to satellite 
communications can be seen as an evolution and 
extension of the current PEP technologies, particular 
useful in the presence of intermittent and disruptive 
channels and/or a high level of network heterogeneity. In 
brief, the advantages offered by DTN are: a better 
resilience to long disruption, the ability to cope with 
intermittent channel availability, the possibility to 
implement both hop-by-hop and end-to-end security, and 
a greater flexibility in the design and implementation of 
advanced QoS techniques. On the other hand, there are 
some issues that still need to be addressed, such as flow 
and congestion control at bundle layer. 
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